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This conference is about the right of peoples to self-determination. The focus of this 
paper is the external aspect of the right: the right to Statehood and secession. The 
paper questions whether the incoherence in the doctrine and practice on external self-
determination is the result of international lawyers using the wrong conceptual tools. 
In particular it asks whether a variant of systems theory know as ‘complexity theory’ 
might allow for the development of a more effective way of conceptualizing the 
emergence of States in world society.  
 
Lack of clarity in the practice of recognition 
 
The incoherence in the international law doctrine on the issue of statehood can be 
seen in the recognition and non-recognition of political communities claiming to be 
States. Why, for example, have Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Sudan been 
admitted to the United Nations, but Somaliland, Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, and Kosovo not?  The issue is particularly striking in relation to Kosovo. At 
the time of writing, just under one-half of the member States of the United Nations 
have recognized Kosovo as a State, although the opposition of Russia and People’s 
Republic of China to accepting the status of Kosovo as a ‘State’ precludes the 
possibility of its admission to the United Nations, which is normally taken as 
resolving controversies over the status of political entities. Moreover, Serbia 
continues to refuse to recognize Kosovo as a State, notwithstanding the territory’s de 
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facto independence from Belgrade, precluding the possibility of statehood by way of 
separation.  
 
There is general agreement in the literature as to how the issue of Kosovo statehood 
should be addressed. There is consensus that the people of Kosovo are a ‘people’ for 
the purposes of the international law, and therefore have a right to self-determination. 
Further, the people of Kosovo have the right to declare their independence. Kosovo is 
not however a ‘colonized’ territory and the right of self-determination does not 
provide a right to statehood in this context. Whether the ‘saving clause’ is applicable 
in the case of Kosovo is also contested, although the protection accorded to the 
territory by the international community would seem to exclude the necessity of 
secession as a remedy of last resort to prevent future human rights abuses.1  
 
The fact that self-determination does not provide a right to statehood does not 
preclude the possibility of Kosovo being established as an independent State, as 
secession is neither lawful nor unlawful as a matter of international law. The right of 
Serbia to territorial integrity is opposable to other States and not to Kosovo as a 
political entity. The test outlined by Lassa Oppenheim remains valid: a political entity 
able to establish itself ‘safely and permanently’ and to exclude the authority of the 
territorial State has a claim to be accepted as a State.2  
 
Whilst there is consensus in the literature that effectiveness is the most important 
criterion of statehood, there is disagreement as to whether this is a sufficient criterion, 
or whether there might be additional criteria and on the content of the other criteria. 
Again, it is not clear where Kosovo fits within the scheme as its independence, which 
is disputed given the role of the international community in the administration of the 
territory, was established following the humanitarian intervention by NATO forces in 
1999, which followed serious violations of the rights of the Kosovo Albanians, but 
which is regarded by a number of writers as being contrary to the prohibition on the 
unlawful use of military force (a norm of jus cogens standing). 
                                                 
1 In cases of serious human rights abuses following the exclusion of one part of the population from the political process, a 
number of authors identify a remedial right of secession through a reverse reading of the so-called ‘saving clause’ in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations (GA Res. 2625 (XXV)) and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign and independent 
State. Whether the remedial right of secession establishes a right of independence opposable to the territorial State and all other 
States erga omnes, or simply negates the proscription on achieving of statehood with the support of external military assistance is 
unclear given the limited doctrine and practice. 
2 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I. Peace [1st ed.] (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), pp. 112-3.  




The recognition of new States 
 
The academic literature on Kosovo is, though, clear on one thing: the determination of 
the status of Kosovo as a State is independent of recognition. The debate between the 
declaratory and constitutive schools on recognition has been resolved in favour of the 
declaratory account, which has traditionally been associated with the question of 
effectiveness. Recognition declares the existence of a fact: ‘An entity is not a State 
because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a State.’3 A political entity that 
meets the criteria of ‘State’ enjoys the inherent rights accorded to States (and not 
available to other political entities), including the right of territorial integrity and 
political independence.  
 
The competing constitutive account holds that the legal status of ‘State’ is constructed 
by way of recognition by already existing States and that a sovereign State has an 
absolute discretion in deciding whether to recognize a political entity as a State or not. 
Whilst differences between the accounts can be overstated, and indeed understated, an 
essential difference between the approaches is that for the constitutive schools 
recognition is ‘status-creating’, whilst for the declaratory schools, ‘it is merely status-
confirming.’4  
 
The declaratory School of recognition has come to predominate in the international 
law literature largely as a reaction to the relativism permitted by the constitutive 
account. According to declaratory school, an entity must either be ‘a State’ or ‘not a 
State’ (it cannot be both). This is not the case in relation to the constitutive account: 
the ‘legal existence’ of a State has ‘a relative character. A state exists legally only in 
its relations to other states.’5 A political entity can be a State in relation to those States 
that have recognized it, and not in relation to other States. James Crawford argues that 
the relativism of the constitutive position is ‘a violation of common sense’, and if it 
cannot be explained then ‘the position itself must be flawed.’6  
                                                 
3 James R Crawford, ‘State’ (2011) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 44. 
4 Stefan Talmon, ‘The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?’ (2004) 75 British 
Yearbook of International Law 101, 101. 
5 Hans Kelsen, ‘Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations’ (1941) 35 American Journal of International Law 
605, 609.  
6 James Crawford, The Creation Of States In International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 21-22. 




The criticism of the constitutive approaches follows naturally from the metaphors that 
describe the emergence of the State in the international community. Consider the 
following descriptions employed by Stefan Talmon: ‘States are natural-born, i.e. 
absolute, subjects of international law and are not relative subjects of international 
law created by existing States’; States, ‘like natural persons… attain legal personality 
at birth; that is, they are “born” subjects of international law’; ‘[m]uch like the birth of 
a child, the creation of a State is predominantly a question of fact, not of law’.7 
Understood in this way the reluctance of international lawyers to admit the possibility 
of relativism, whereby a political entity is at the same time both ‘a State’ and ‘not a 
State’, depending on the perspective of the observing State, appears understandable.  
 
State as coupling of law and politics system 
 
The anthropomorphic metaphor of State as Person has been a common feature of the 
concept of the State from the time of the early international law positivists. But a 
State is not a fact in the same way that a human person is a fact. From the time of 
Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel, the sovereign State has been understood as an 
independent political community organization in a particular territory under a system 
of government. The international law concept of ‘State’ can, then, be understood as a 
the joining of law and politics under a system of government. It is then possible to 
conceptualize the problem of the identification of ‘State’ in terms of the identification 
of a  political entity that represents the structural coupling of the law and politics 
systems.8 The boundaries of the State (on this understanding) can then be defined in 
terms of the territorial constitutional space ‘occupied’ by both the legal system and 
the political system, i.e. the space ‘occupied’ by an effective legal system – law, 
structurally coupled with politics – and a legitimate political system – politics, 
structurally coupled with law.  
 
The claim to national self-determination is a claim for the  recognition of the political 
entity as an independent political community and for the recognition of the 
boundaries of the system as international borders – the nature of the border gives an 
                                                 
7 Talmon (n 4) passim.  
8 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, trans. Klaus Ziegert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 410.  
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entity its (designated) character as a State. The question is whether a system 
establishes its own boundaries – and a single authoritative version of its own 
boundaries (within the practical and normative limits of the environment of world 
society) – or whether there can be multiple versions and visions of the boundaries of 
autonomous politico-legal systems.  
 
Open and closed systems  
 
The answer to the question depends on whether we understand law and politics as 
‘open’ or ‘closed’ systems. A ‘closed’ system defines its own boundaries: both in 
terms of the scope of those boundaries and the nature of those boundaries (this is a 
single actor perspective on the establishment of a boundary). An ‘open’ systems 
approach accepts that other actors and systems can influence the way in which the 
system operates and that the boundaries of the system may be ‘seen’ differently by the 
different actors (this is a multiple actor perspective on the establishment of a 
boundary).  
 
The closed systems model of State resonates to some extent with the traditional 
accounts of statehood in international law, which have tended to understand the State 
to be a self-willed or self-producing entity. The idea can be seen in the works, inter 
alios, of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Emmerich de Vattel that seek to explain 
the establishment of Sovereign authority in the state-of-nature and in the declaratory 
account of recognition, which concludes that a community that understands itself to 
be a State and which establishes its factual political and legal independence is a State, 
subject only to the factual limits imposed by other systems – including the factual 
limit imposed on new States by the uti possidetis doctrine.  
 
The problem for the model is that it proves deficient when contrasted with the extant 
practice of the international community, which does not accept that new States can 
emerge on their own terms (consider, for example, the statehood claims of Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transdniestria); admits the possibility of limited recognition by 
neighbouring and other States (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia); and in the case of Kosovo allows significant disagreement as to 
whether the territory is a State, or not. In other worlds, whilst the closed system model 
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might be able to explain how a law or politics system can make sense of the world in 
its own terms, it cannot help us to solve the practical questions of the emergence of 
entities we call State in world society.  
 
Rather than proceed from a single perspective – that of the self-producing system (or 
national self-determination unit) – we might accept that different visions and versions 
of the existence, nature and place of the boundary might be relevant in the 
establishment of the State. The approach is suggested by an application of one variant 




Complexity theory emerged as a body of scientific thinking about certain ‘complex’ 
systems in the second half of the twentieth century that further challenged the 
Newtonian paradigm of a Clockwork Universe that could be taken apart and subjected 
to analysis, with the prior assumption being that all systems, even highly complicated 
systems, were ‘the sum of their parts’ and that the future shape and form of any 
system could, in principle, be predicted. (A complicated mechanism, like a clock, can 
be understood by examining its component elements.) The insight from scientists 
working on the weather and those looking at cells, the brain, ecosystems, etc. was that 
certain (chaotic and complex) systems could not be understood in this reductionist 
way: these systems were observed to be ‘greater than the sum of their parts’. It is not 
possible, for example, to understand an ecosystem (the patterned behaviour of 
organisms within a particular space) simply by examining the constituent elements. 
The patterned behaviours of chaotic and complex systems were observed to be the 
result of the actions of the individual components, and their interactions with each 
other, and their interactions with the environment outside of the system.  
 
The patterned behaviour of a complex system is the result of the actions and reaction 
of agents following rules. The emergent nature of the complex system that results 
from those actions and interactions means that no two systems will be the same – 
even if the constituent agents start in the same place. Consider the example of a game 
of chess: actors (the players) operate within a relatively simply set of rules; develop 
strategies within those rules; and respond to how the other players develop their 
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strategies.  No two games of chess are ever the same (notwithstanding the limited set 
of rules) and the pattern of the game emerges from the actions and reactions of the 
players. The same can be said about human societies and the insights from complexity 
have been applied in a wide variety of contexts, in both the natural and the social 
sciences, including to economic systems, the world wide web, and to human societies, 
whether organized at the local or global level. 
 
A rainforest ecosystem is the paradigmatic complex system. The example highlights 
the difficulty of modelling complex systems, which are defined by their 
incompressibility (they cannot be simplified without losing some element that makes 
them complex) and openness  (agents sometimes interact directly with elements in the 
external environment). The open nature of complex adaptive systems  means that it 
can be difficult to tell what is ‘system’ and what is ‘not-system’. Establishing the 
place of the boundary of a complex adaptive system is then far from straightforward. 
As a result of the incompressibility and openness of a complex system, any 
description of the system and its boundaries inevitably involves the making of choices 
by the observer. This process of separating is called framing.  
 
The key point is that the framing of a complex system is undertaken by an observer. 
Any description of a complex system concerns both the fact of patterned behaviour 
and the making of choices by those framing the system.9 Given both the requirement 
to simplify a complex adaptive system in order to describe it, and the impossibility of 
capturing the complexity of the system in any description, there can be different 
descriptions of the same system by different observers, and no reason to conclude that 
each observer will ‘see’ the same version of the boundary: there can be multiple 
observations of the boundaries of a complex adaptive system.  
 
‘Complexity’ concerns the study of complex adaptive systems that cannot be 
understood by an examination of the individuals parts: the whole is different from the 
sum of the parts. The nature and character of the system is provided by (1) the nature 
of the individual units (agents); (2) their interactions with each other; and (3) their 
interactions with the local and wider environment. A change in one of these areas can 
                                                 
9 Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism, Understanding Complex Systems (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 4. 
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have significant and unpredicted effects on the system as a whole. Melanie Mitchell 
identifies the following common properties of complex systems (mainly focused on 
complexity in the natural sciences): (1) Complex systems are self-organizing systems. 
Complex systems consist of large networks of individual components each typically 
following relatively simply rules with no central control or leader. It is the collective 
actions of the components that give rise to the complex patterns of behaviour. (2) 
Complex systems produce and use information and signals from their internal and 
external environments. (3) All these systems adapt (i.e. change their behaviour) 
through learning or evolutional processes.10 This leads to a definition of the ‘complex 
system’: ‘a system in which large networks of components with no central control and 
simple rules of operation give rise to complex collective behaviour, sophisticated 
information processes, and adaption via learning or evolution.’11  
 
Observing complex systems of law and politics 
 
Complex systems have, then, the following characteristics: agents follow rules, but 
act with some autonomy; agents are in a network of relationships; the patterned 
behaviours of agents can be framed as a system; system characteristics are not derived 
only from the actions of agents; agents act and react, relying on information within 
and outside system; the system therefore evolves without any guiding hand, although 
system memory constrains future possibilities. The argument here is that systems of 
law and politics can be understood as complex systems and modelled as patterned 
communications between authorities and subjects.  
 
Consider the law system, for example. Law is self-organizing: there is no central 
controller or guiding hand – neither the legislature or supreme court is able to control 
the shape and form of the entire system. The law system is the emergent, undirected, 
pattern of normative communications framed in terms of law adopted by authorities 
and applied to subjects. It is the result of the communicative actions of a large 
network of agents (legislatures, courts, judges, lawyers, litigants and others), who are 
capable of responding to other actors and other systems, and who operate with no 
overall guiding hand. The patterned communications of the law system are a 
                                                 
10 Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 12-13. 
11 Ibid., p. 13.  
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consequence of the actions and reactions of law-actors within the system, with the 
legal system representing the ‘memory’ of previous actions and interactions and 
providing ‘feedback’ to agents, who operate in accordance with certain rules.  
 
The politics system is the emergent patterned system of communications adopted by 
those in power to the subjects of the political regime. Politics is the pattern of 
regulatory communications concerned with the adoption of collective binding 
decisions by the government in relation to the governed. There is no single guiding 
hand or omnipotent power in the State: regulations can be adopted by legislatives, 
executives and administrative bodies. Collectively binding decisions emerge through 
the processing of information by agents within the system, often relying on feedback 
loops.  
 
Conclusion: observing States complex systems  
 
Where State is defined in terms of the observation of the emergent patterned 
communications of coevolved and coexistent law and politics systems, complexity 
theory suggests that the existence and emergence of States in world society is 
simultaneously a function of the activity of the system (there must be patterned 
behaviour that can be observed) and the product of the strategy of description 
involved in the act of observation when separating the law and politics systems from 
the background noise of world society. 
 
The key insights from complexity are that (1) there must be complex law and politics 
system to be ‘observed’; (2) the those law and politics systems do not establish a 
definitive account of their boundaries; (3) there is no natural boundary to the complex 
systems of law and politics; (4) the boundary is both a function of the operation of the 
relevant system and the strategic act of observation; (5) each strategic observer of the 
boundary can ‘see’ its own version of the boundary; and (6) given the limitations of 
knowledge regarding complex adaptive systems and the importance of perspective, 
there is no reason to prefer one version or vision of the boundary to another.  
 
Complexity suggest, then, that the existence of States is both a function of domestic 
law and politics systems and the act of description in the observation of States in 
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world society,  allowing the possibility of a political entity being (at one and the same 
time) ‘a State’ and ‘not a State’. The conclusion must be that statehood is not 
achieved by the actions of any single actor in world politics, but through the complex 
interactions of a number of agents. This insight provides the basis for an important 
agenda for future research and possibility the re-thinking our understanding of the 
ways that new States emerge.  
 
